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The Growth Potential of Startups over the Business Cycle†
By Petr Sedlácˇek and Vincent Sterk*
This paper shows that employment in cohorts of US firms is strongly 
influenced by aggregate conditions at the time of their entry. 
Employment fluctuations of startups are procyclical, they persist 
into later years, and cohort-level employment variations are largely 
driven by differences in firm size, rather than the number of firms. 
An estimated general equilibrium firm dynamics model reveals 
that aggregate conditions at birth, rather than post-entry choices, 
drive the majority of cohort-level employment variation by affecting 
the share of startups with high growth potential. In the aggregate, 
changes in startup conditions result in large, slow-moving fluctua-
tions in employment. (JEL D25, E24, E32, J23, L25, M13)
The number of firm startups in the United States fell sharply during the Great 
Recession.1 Given the importance of startups for aggregate job creation, the decline 
in entry might create a long-lasting drag on aggregate employment and output. In 
this paper, we show that the roughly two million startups which did enter during the 
downturn are not only less plentiful, but may also be weaker in their potential to 
create jobs in the future. Specifically, we document that firms born in cohorts with 
weak job creation upon entry tend to remain persistently smaller on average, even 
when the aggregate economy recovers. Underlying this pattern are changes in the 
types of startups with respect to their potential to grow large. Moreover, rather than 
fading out over time, decisions taken at the entry phase leave an increasingly large 
footprint on the macroeconomy as startups age.
Using Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), we follow cohorts of firms, starting 
from their year of entry. The data span all US nongovernment sectors and cover 
the years from 1979 to 2013. We document three new stylized facts: (i) employ-
ment created by startups is volatile and procyclical; (ii) these variations persist to 
1 According to the Business Dynamics Statistics, the number of startups in 2009 was 30 percent below its 
 precrisis level in 2006. 
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a great extent as cohorts age, sharply contrasting with the strong mean-reversion 
in  aggregate employment; and (iii) the majority of variation in employment across 
cohorts, conditional on age, is driven by changes in average firm size rather than in 
the number of firms within cohorts.
The empirical patterns suggest that cohorts born at different stages of the busi-
ness cycle are composed of different types of firms, giving rise to long-lasting 
effects. However, the composition of startups is unobserved and variations in firm 
size across cohorts are also driven by post-entry decisions made by a given mix of 
firms. To disentangle the two and to quantify the impact of composition changes, 
we estimate a general equilibrium firm dynamics model with aggregate uncertainty, 
using both aggregate and cohort-level data. We find that, because of changes in 
startup composition, the number of jobs created by a cohort is largely determined by 
the cyclical state of the economy in the year of its entry.
In the model, firm heterogeneity stems from differences in the demand for their 
products. Some firms produce niche goods which appeal only to a small subset of 
consumers, whereas others produce goods that may serve mass markets.2 The type 
of good to be produced is chosen during the startup phase. Upon entry, demand is 
constrained by the size of the firm’s consumer base, which can be expanded at the 
expense of a convex marketing cost. A firm’s incentive to do so, however, depends 
critically on the type of good it has chosen to produce. This generates heterogeneity 
in growth profiles across startups. A coordination friction among aspiring startups 
gives rise to an equilibrium with simultaneous entry of firms with high and low 
growth potential.3
The composition of startups fluctuates endogenously over the business cycle in 
our model. This happens because aggregate shocks affect the profitability of different 
types of firms asymmetrically. The reason for the latter is that firm types differ in their 
optimal expenditure shares devoted to various cost components (production, entry, 
and consumer base accumulation). This, in turn, generates heterogeneity in the sensi-
tivity of firms to different shocks affecting these costs. We allow for aggregate shocks 
to each of the cost categories and estimate their importance from the data.
The estimation reveals that a demand shock, which affects the costs of consumer 
base accumulation, is quantitatively the most important driver of composition fluc-
tuations. A positive demand shock increases the values of all firm types, but espe-
cially the values of the types producing mass goods, which optimally devote a large 
fraction of expenditures to relaxing their demand constraints. This induces a shift 
in the composition of startups toward types which have the potential to grow large. 
Simultaneously, aggregate expenditures on marketing increase, whereas firm profits 
decline. We document external support for this mechanism by showing that, in the 
data, years of high advertising expenditures and low profits give rise to cohorts of 
startups that grow relatively large.
2 By niche firms we mean businesses which are not very scalable as the nature of the good is such that the group 
of consumers to which they could potentially sell is small. This definition is broad in scope and may include cus-
tomized or luxury goods, but not exclusively so. 
3 In the data, there are many firms that grow old but never become large. In 2007, the fraction of firms with 10 
or fewer employees among firms between 21 and 25 years of age was about two-thirds. This is also consistent with 
empirical evidence that many starting entrepreneurs have low growth expectations (see Campbell and De Nardi 
2009 and Hurst and Pugsley 2011). 
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We also use the estimated model to show that macroeconomic conditions at the 
startup phase are important in shaping aggregate fluctuations. In particular, the 
contribution of startup conditions to aggregate employment fluctuations evolves 
similarly to the trend component of the employment rate, often discarded in busi-
ness-cycle analysis. Our results thus help to understand the drivers of macroeco-
nomic fluctuations at a more complete range of frequencies.
An important prerequisite of our analysis is the estimation of the model using 
maximum likelihood. It is well known that solving heterogeneous firm models with 
aggregate uncertainty is a complex problem, because the aggregate state includes 
entire distributions of firm-specific variables. A methodological contribution of this 
paper is to design a computational strategy which allows us to solve the model 
quickly, and thereby enables us to estimate structural parameters.
The empirical results in this paper complement the analysis in Haltiwanger, 
Jarmin, and Miranda (2013), who emphasize the importance of young firms for 
aggregate job creation on average. Cyclical patterns in firm entry are studied in 
Campbell (1998) and Lee and Mukoyama (2012), who analyze the behavior of 
entering and exiting firms in the manufacturing sector. Unlike these studies, we 
exploit the newly developed BDS data to follow cohorts of firms as they age, which 
enables us to investigate how their later job creation is affected by aggregate condi-
tions at the time of their birth.4
The model builds on a rapidly growing literature studying the importance of 
demand factors in accounting for firm-level and aggregate outcomes. Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2016) provide evidence that size differences between 
young and old plants cannot be well accounted for by differences in technological 
efficiency. They estimate a model which suggests an important role for demand 
accumulation over the firm life cycle. Holmes and Stevens (2014) provide empirical 
evidence for the presence of niche and mass firms even within narrowly defined 
industries.5 Abbring and Campbell (2005) estimate a model with firm-level demand 
shocks and find that pre-entry scale decisions are important for the variation in 
sales across existing firms. Other studies in which demand (accumulation) plays 
an important role include Arkolakis (2010); Drozd and Nosal (2012); Gourio and 
Rudanko (2014); Perla (2016); and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2006). We 
integrate a highly tractable notion of consumer demand accumulation into a model 
with monopolistically competitive firms, endogenous entry, and aggregate uncer-
tainty, as in, e.g., Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012).
Our model also relates to neoclassical models of firm dynamics, which typically 
feature heterogeneity in firms’ technologies. A workhorse model is presented in 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Models focusing on entry and exit decisions in 
the propagation of shocks include Campbell (1998); Clementi and Palazzo (2016); 
and Lee and Mukoyama (2012). In contrast to these studies, we use our general 
4 Further related studies include Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) and Fort et al. (2013), who study the cycli-
cal sensitivities of large versus small and younger versus older firms, but do not focus on startups or cohorts. Decker 
et al. (2013) use BDS data to document a downward trend in the pace of business dynamism, and find that a secular 
decline in the number of startups accounts for much of this trend decline. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 
(2009) use a cross-country dataset to study average post-entry behavior of young firms. 
5 Our notion of niche goods is somewhat broader than the one of Holmes and Stevens (2014), who associate 
the term with goods that require a high degree of customization. We think of niche goods as all goods for which the 
attraction of new customers, beyond a limited initial group, generates only small increases in sales. 
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equilibrium firm dynamics model as an empirical tool to uncover an unobservable 
state of the aggregate economy: the distribution of entrant types with respect to their 
growth potential.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the 
data and presents empirical stylized facts. The model and its parametrization are 
described in Sections II and III, respectively. Section IV presents the model results 
and Section V provides concluding remarks.
I. Empirical Evidence
Startups are widely recognized to be important drivers of aggregate job creation 
on average (see, e.g., Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 2013). This section presents 
three stylized facts regarding cyclical patterns of employment by young US firms, 
both at the time of their entry and in later years. Our units of analysis are cohorts, 
that is, aggregates over firms born in the same year. Three stylized facts emerge.
Fact 1: Employment created by startups is volatile and procyclical.
Fact 2: Cyclical variations of startup employment persist into later years.
Fact 3: Cyclical variations of cohort-level employment are mainly driven by fluc-
tuations in firm size, with an increasing importance as cohorts age.
The first stylized fact complements empirical evidence presented in Campbell 
(1998) and Lee and Mukoyama (2012). These authors find that the number of new 
manufacturing plants and their job creation is procyclical. Our analysis, by contrast, 
is not confined to a single industry and it applies to firms rather than establishments.6 
Pugsley and S¸ahin (2014) use the BDS to study secular changes in firm demograph-
ics and cyclical behavior of firms conditional on age. To the best of our knowledge, 
our second and third stylized facts have no precedent in the empirical literature. The 
end of this section discusses potential explanations for the stylized facts.
A. Data
The BDS database is based on administrative records of US firms covering 
98 percent of private employment. This is an important advantage over alternative 
data sources, especially given our objective to study implications for aggregate out-
comes. We use the available annual information on the number of firms and their job 
creation, broken down into age categories, and for the period from 1979 to 2013.7
The BDS is an annual database which allows us to follow cohorts of new firms 
for up to five years after they enter the economy. Thereafter, the BDS groups firms 
into age categories spanning five years. Nevertheless, our stylized facts also hold for 
6 An establishment is defined as a single physical location where business is conducted. A firm is a business 
organization consisting of one or more establishments that were specified under common ownership or control. 
7 The data represent a snapshot taken in March of each year. Availability starts in 1976, but we drop the initial 
three years following Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012), who cast doubt on the data quality for the years prior to 
1979. 
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averages of firms aged 6–10 and 11–15 years. Online Appendix A.6 presents further 
evidence that our stylized facts hold beyond the age of five, based on microdata 
underlying the BDS.
Cyclical indicators from sources outside the BDS are constructed as 
 March-to-March averages, consistent with BDS timing. Throughout the paper, 
detrending is conducted using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing 
coefficient of 100 for annual data. The online Appendix provides extensive robust-
ness exercises with respect to the detrending method (A.1), construction of the 
measure of employment (A.2), the exact timing of firm entry (A.3), as well as an 
analysis of establishments (A.5), rather than firms.
B. The Cyclicality of Startup Job Creation
Let  M a, t be the number of firms and  N a, t total employment in a cohort of firms of age 
a in year  t . Startups enter with age  a = 0 . We measure total employment of a given 
cohort as the cumulative net job creation since birth, i.e.,  N a, t =  ∑ i=0 a NJ C i, t−a+i , 
where  NJ C a, t is the net number of jobs created in firms of age  a in year  t .
To visualize the cyclicality of cohort-level employment, Figure 1 displays 
employment levels (in deviations from the respective means) of (i) cohorts of 
startups; (ii) cohorts of five-year-old firms, where the time series is shifted back 
to the year of their birth; and (iii) the aggregate employment growth rate. Several 
patterns stand out. First, fluctuations in cohort-level employment are large, with 
Figure 1. Cohort-Level Employment by Year of Birth and Aggregate Employment Growth by Year
Notes: Cohort-level employment in percent deviations from the mean across cohorts of firms of the same age and 
the year-on-year aggregate employment growth rate. Shaded areas are NBER recessions. 
Sources: BDS, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
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a volatility exceeding four times the volatility of aggregate employment growth. 
Also, the cohort-level volatility does not appear to diminish with age. Second, 
job creation by startups and aggregate employment growth move together and 
drop during recession years, indicated by shaded areas. The correlation coefficient 
between entrant employment and aggregate employment growth (GDP growth) is 
0.36 (0.45).
C. Persistence in Cohort-Level Employment
To quantify the persistence of cohort-level employment, we compute the autocor-
relation coefficients of total employment by startups in year  t with total employment 
by the same cohort in year  t + a . Figure 2 reports these coefficients, as well as the 
autocorrelation coefficients for aggregate employment. For comparability, we take 
logs and HP detrend all variables (i.e., we take out the trend of employment across 
cohorts of the same age and of aggregate employment).
Figure 2 shows that at the cohort level, the autocorrelation with startup employ-
ment remains high up to the age of 5. Moving beyond the age of 5, we find that the 
correlation of employment in 11–15-year-old firms with entrant job creation 15 years 
earlier is  0.56 (not plotted). Thus, cyclical differences in employment across cohorts 
persist to a great extent into later years. In other words, we find little evidence that 
cohorts with initially low levels of employment catch up with other cohorts as they 
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Figure 2. Autocorrelations of Cohort-Level and Aggregate Employment
Notes: Cohort-level refers to autocorrelations of total employment by cohorts of startups with total employment of 
the same cohort  a years in the future, i.e.,  corr ( N ˆ0, t ,  N ˆa, t+a ) , where hats indicate log deviations from an HP trend 
taken across cohorts of the same age. Aggregate refers to autocorrelations of aggregate employment in year  t and 
t + a , i.e.,  corr ( N ˆagg, t ,  N ˆagg, t+a ) , again for data in log deviations from an HP trend. 
Sources: BDS, BLS
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age. This lack of mean reversion contrasts aggregate employment, which displays 
no positive autocorrelation beyond a two-year horizon.
D. Decomposing Cohort-Level Employment Variation
Next, we investigate whether the observed variations of cohort-level employ-
ment are driven primarily by changes in the number of firms within the cohort (the 
extensive margin) or by average size (the intensive margin, i.e., the average level of 
employment per firm).
Toward this end, we decompose the natural logarithm of cohort-level employment 
as  ln  N a, t = ln  S 0, t−a +  ∑ j=1 a ln  γ j, t−a+j + ln  M 0, t−a +  ∑ j=1 a ln  δ j, t−a+j , where  S a, t 
is average firm size within the cohort,  M a, t is the number of firms,  γ j, t ≡   S j, t  _____  S j−1, t−1 
denotes average size growth, and  δ j, t ≡   M j, t  ______  M j−1, t−1 denotes the average firm survival 
rate. Based on the expression above, the variance of employment can be decom-
posed as
    var  ( N ̂a, t ) =  cov  ( N ˆa, t ,  S ˆ0, t−a ) +  ∑ 
j=1
a
 cov  ( N ˆa, t ,  γ ˆj, t−a+j ) 

intensive margin
 
 
 
 +  cov  ( N ˆa, t ,  M ˆ 0, t−a ) +  ∑ 
j=1
a
 cov  ( N ˆa, t ,  δ ˆj, t−a+j ) 

extensive margin
 
 
 +  η t , 
where a hat indicates deviations from an HP-filter trend of a logged variable and  η t 
is a residual term coming from the detrending method.8 The first two terms on the 
right-hand side jointly capture the contribution of the intensive margin (average 
size) to the total variance. The first term individually captures the contribution of 
average size in the year of entry alone. The third and fourth terms capture the con-
tributions of the extensive margin.
The importance of the intensive margin is made clear by Figure 3. The total 
shaded area represents the contributions of average size variations to cohort-level 
employment fluctuations at different ages. The white area accounts for the contri-
bution of variation in the number of firms.9 Notice that the contribution of average 
firm size variation is increasing as the cohort ages (accounting for about 50 percent 
at birth and 63 percent at age five). Extending the analysis to older firms reveals 
that the average size margin remains very important in determining variations in 
employment across cohorts, accounting for 70 percent among 11–15-year-old firms 
(not plotted).
Within the total shaded area in Figure 3, different shades break down the contri-
bution of the intensive margin by age, with the lightest shade denoting startup size. 
8 In our case, the residual  η is negligible, not exceeding 0.01 percent of  var ( N ˆa, t ) . 
9 The vast majority of the contribution of the extensive margin is due to fluctuations in the number of startups. 
Changes in firm survival rates account on average for only 1 percent of employment variation among firms aged 
one to five years. 
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The contribution of the latter to cohort-level employment variation is large, account-
ing for 38 percent for five-year-old firms.
Before presenting the model, we briefly discuss two potential explanations that 
are outside our model. One possibility is that, during recessions, job creation within 
newborn cohorts declines because of a reallocation of activity between sectors. 
Another possibility is that our findings are driven by fluctuations in the entry of 
necessity entrepreneurs, who start businesses as a means of escaping unemployment. 
However, online Appendix A.7 provides evidence that our stylized facts hold true, 
with a few exceptions, also within sectors and that the vast majority of employment 
variation of five-year-old firms is driven by large firms rather than small businesses.
II. The Model
The empirical evidence presented in the previous section suggests that fluctua-
tions in cohort-level employment are partly driven by changes in the composition 
of startups with respect to their growth potential. However, because firms’ growth 
potential is unobserved, the data alone do not allow us to quantify the importance 
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Figure 3. Contributions to Variation in Cohort-Level Employment
Note: Contributions (in percent) of changes in the number of firms and in average firm size at different ages to the 
variation in cohort-level employment. 
Source: BDS
3190 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW OCTOBER 2017
of such composition changes. For the same reason, the empirical facts can provide 
only limited information about the aggregate implications of decisions made at the 
entry stage.
To address these issues, we propose and estimate a general equilibrium model of 
the life cycles of heterogeneous firms which produce differentiated goods. Demand 
is restricted by the size of a firm’s consumer base, which can be expanded by paying 
a convex marketing cost. Differences in the growth potential of startups stem from 
heterogeneity in the demand characteristics of goods. For some goods, demand is 
concentrated among only a small subset of consumers (niche goods). Other goods, 
by contrast, can potentially serve a broad demand base (mass goods). Firms which 
produce niche goods optimally invest little into expansion of the consumer base 
and therefore stay small. The opposite is true for firms which produce mass goods, 
which grow large over time.
Importantly, startups are free to decide which type of good to produce. As a result, 
the composition of startups with respect to their growth potential fluctuates endoge-
nously over the business cycle. This happens as different firm types optimally allo-
cate their expenditures differently over each of three cost categories: costs of entry, 
costs of production, and costs of marketing. Aggregate shocks, which affect these 
cost categories differentially, then create type-specific fluctuations in firm profitabil-
ity. This in turn generates endogenous fluctuations in startup composition.
The model includes several aggregate shocks affecting each of the three cost 
categories. We then use aggregate and firm-level data to estimate the relative 
importance of these shocks. As a by-product of the estimation, we back out the 
entire time-varying distribution of startups with respect to their growth potential. 
We exploit this to quantify the importance of firm entry in determining fluctua-
tions at the cohort level and the aggregate level, and to understand the drivers of 
fluctuations in startup composition. The following subsections describe the model. 
Detailed derivations and a formal definition of the equilibrium can be found in 
online Appendix B.
A. Household
There is a representative household which owns all firms, chooses consumption 
of all the goods varieties, and supplies labor on a perfectly competitive market.10 
We first describe household preferences and then move on to optimal household 
decisions.
Household Preferences.—The representative household consists of a continuum 
of members, indexed by  k . Household members have heterogeneous preferences 
over a continuum of available goods varieties, indexed by  j . In order to enjoy utility 
from a particular good, a member has to be made aware that the good exists. This 
requires a costly marketing effort by the producer of the good.
10 Firm dynamics models with more detailed descriptions of the labor market include, e.g., Elsby and Michaels 
(2013); Kaas and Kircher (2015); and Sedlácˇek (2015). 
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Time is discrete and indexed by  t . Let  Ω t be the set of available goods and 
define  C t =  ∫     C k, t dk as the consumption of the representative household. Here,  C k, t 
is the consumption bundle of household member  k , which is given by
  C k, t =  ( ∫ j∈ Ω t  
 
 1 k, j, t  θ k, j  
1 _η  c k, j, t  
η−1
 ____η  dj) 
 η ____ η−1
 ,
where  1 k, j, t is an indicator function equal to 1 if member  k is aware of good  j in 
period  t and 0 otherwise. Further,  θ k, j is a utility weight of member  k for good  j , 
 c k, j, t is the quantity of good  j consumed by member  k , and  η > 1 is the elasticity 
of substitution between goods varieties. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
the distribution of household members’ utility weights for a particular good ( θ k, j ) 
can be summarized by a cumulative distribution function  F j ( θ k, j ) with support 
 [ θ j min ,  θ j max ], and  θ j min > 0. 
Firms can add household members to their pool of consumers by making costly 
marketing investments, which can be fully directed. Cost minimization then dictates 
that firms first attract consumers with the highest valuations for their goods (i.e., 
highest levels of  θ k, j ). Let the mass of household members aware of (and thus con-
suming) good  j be denoted by  s j, t . We will refer to  s j, t as the firm’s consumer base. 
Finally, let us define the utility weight for good  j at the household level as
  κ j ( s j, t ) =  ∫  _ θ ( s j, t )  θ j max   θ k, j d F j  ( θ k, j ) ,
where  
_ θ ( s j, t ) is the lowest utility weight among all household members who are 
aware of good  j in period  t .
The relevant firm-specific demand characteristics of a good are fully summarized 
by the function  κ j ( s j, t ) . Note that  κ j ( s j, t ) is increasing in the consumer base,  s j, t , 
because each additional consumer demands a positive amount of good  j . However, 
the extent to which higher levels of the consumer base increase  κ j ( s j, t ) is fully deter-
mined by the preference distribution for good  j ,  F j ( θ k, j ) .
Below we will show that the elasticity of  κ j with respect to  s is a crucial determi-
nant of a firm’s growth potential. Further, Section IIIA will clarify that low elastic-
ities are associated with niche goods, for which demand is relatively concentrated 
among a small subset of consumers. For such goods, gains from demand investment 
are relatively low. On the other side of the spectrum are high-elasticity mass goods, 
for which demand investment generates relatively high returns.
Household Decisions.—We assume that utility is linear with respect to labor sup-
ply,  N t . Following indivisible labor models, we interpret  N t as the employment rate (see, e.g., Rogerson 1988). The household maximizes the expected present value of 
lifetime utility, subject to its budget constraint, taking prices and wages as given:
  max 
 { C t ,  N t ,  c k, j, t } t=0 ∞ 
    E 0  ∑ 
t=0
∞
  β t (  C t 1−σ − 1 _______1 − σ − ν  Z t  N t) 
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subject to 
(1)  ∫ 
k
 
 
 ∫ j∈ Ω t  
 
 p j, t  c k, j, t dj dk =  P t  W t  N t +  Π t ,
where  β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s subjective discount factor,  σ > 0 is the coef-
ficient of risk aversion,  ν > 0 is a parameter capturing the disutility of labor,  Z t is a 
stochastic labor preference shock,  W t is the real wage,  Π t denotes nominal aggregate 
firm profits,  p j, t is the price of good  j , and  P t is the aggregate price index. The latter 
can be shown to be  P t =  ( ∫ j∈ Ω t  
  κ j ( s j, t )  p j, t 1−η dj)  1 ____ 1−η .
The resulting optimal employment choice obeys the familiar first-order condi-
tion  W t  C t −σ =  Z t ν , with  Z t driving a wedge between the marginal product of labor 
and the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution. This labor wedge is typically 
thought of as a shock capturing time-varying labor market frictions and as such it 
directly affects firms’ wage costs.
The first-order conditions for consumption lead to the following demand function:
(2)  c j, t =  κ j ( s j, t )  (  p j, t  ___ P t ) 
−η
  C t . 
The above implies that, as in standard models of monopolistically competitive firms, 
consumer demand for good  j depends on aggregate consumption,  C t , and the relative 
price,  p j, t / P t . The novel feature of our model is that demand is also affected by the 
firm’s consumer base,  s j, t .
B. Firms
There is an endogenous mass of firms which supply differentiated goods varieties 
on a monopolistically competitive market. We first describe the behavior of incum-
bent firms and then discuss the startup phase.
Incumbent Firms.—Firms operate a technology  y j, t =  A t  n j, t G , where  y j, t is the 
amount of output produced by firm  j ,  n j, t G is the amount of labor used in goods 
production, and  A t is aggregate total factor productivity (TFP).11 The sales of the 
firm are constrained by the demand function for their good, equation (2). Each 
firm produces a unique goods variety and hence we index both firms and goods 
varieties by  j . Firms exit with an exogenous, but age-dependent probability  ρ a , 
where  a denotes the firm’s age.12
11 It is straightforward to extend the model to include firm-specific TFP levels,  
_
 aj , such that firm-level output is 
given by  y j, t =  A t  _ aj  n j, t G . However, it can be shown that in our application  _ aj is isomorphic to a scaling factor in 
the preference distribution  F j and hence we opt to normalize  _ aj to 1 for all  j . 
12 Clearly, this assumption is a simplification as exit rates vary over time and to be related to firm productivity 
(see, e.g., Bartelsman and Doms 2000). Therefore, online Appendix E.1 shows that allowing for stochastic variation 
in exit rates consistent with the data does not substantially affect our results. This is consistent with the variance 
decomposition in Section ID which implies that variation in exit rates explains on average only 1 percent of fluctu-
ations in cohort-level employment for firms aged one to five years. 
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Firms can relax their demand constraints by exerting costly marketing efforts. 
Specifically, the consumer base of firm  j evolves as
(3)  s j, t =  s j, t−1 +  Q t  g j, t ,
where  g j, t denotes the amount of marketing and  Q t is an aggregate demand 
shock.13 Given  s j, t−1 and  g j, t , a decline in  Q t reduces the consumer base  s j, t and 
hence tightens the firms’ demand constraint (2). While we take  Q t as an exogenous 
object to be estimated from the data, one could think of it as a shift in consumers’ 
preferences affecting the susceptibility to firms’ marketing efforts.
We further assume that firms enter with no consumer base and that a unit of 
marketing requires an amount of labor given by  n j, t M = ζ( g j, t ) , where  ζ( · ) is an 
increasing and convex function. The convexity of this cost induces firms to grow 
only gradually as they age, in line with the positive relation between the age and size 
of young firms in the BDS. The adjustment cost further makes the consumer base a 
firm-level state variable, as in Gourio and Rudanko (2014).
Firms maximize the expected present value of real profits:
   V j ( s j, t−1 ,   t ; a) =  max 
 n j, t 
G,  n j, t 
M ,  p j, t ,  g j, t ,  s j, t 
 
 
  [ y j, t  p j, t / P t −  W t  ( n j, t G +  n j, t M ) 
 + (1 −  ρ a )  E t  Λ t  V j  ( s j, t ,   t+1 ; a +1) ] 
subject to (i) their demand constraint  y j, t =  κ j ( s j, t )  (  p j, t  ___ P t ) 
−η  Y t , where  Y t is aggregate 
demand; (ii) the evolution of their consumer base, equation (3); and (iii) the evolu-
tion of the aggregate state of the economy, denoted by   t and described later. In the 
equation above,  V j is the asset value of firm  j and  Λ t = β  (  C t  ___  C t+1 ) 
σ is the stochastic 
discount factor of the representative household.
The optimal pricing decision takes on the familiar form of a constant markup 
over the nominal marginal cost of production:  p j, t =  η ___ η − 1  P t  W t/ A t . This in turn 
implies that all firms set the same price. Relative prices can then be expressed 
as  p j, t / P t =  ( ∫ j∈ Ω t  
  κ j ( s j, t ) dj)  1 ____ η−1 . This condition stems from households’ love of 
variety and is similar to the variety effect in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012). In 
our model, however, this effect depends not only on the set of available goods vari-
eties,  Ω t , but also on the distribution of firms’ consumer bases.
Finally, the optimal amount of marketing investment satisfies the following 
first-order condition:
(4)  ζ′ ( g j, t ) _____ Q t  =  ϵ j, t 
κ, s   n j, t 
G
 ___ s j, t  1 ____ η − 1 +  (1 −  ρ a )  E t  Λ t, t+1  
ζ′ ( g j, t+1 ) _______ Q t+1   
 W t+1  ____ W t ,
13 In our setup, firms use marketing to make consumers aware that a good exists. We find it natural to assume 
that consumers do not forget about goods, implying zero depreciation of the consumer base. Nevertheless, online 
Appendix E.5 shows that similar results are obtained when we consider positive depreciation. 
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where a prime denotes the first derivative and  ϵ j, t κ, s ≡   κ j ′ ( s j, t )  s j, t _______  κ j ( s j, t ) is the elasticity 
of  κ j ( s j, t ) with respect to the consumer base  s j, t , which we refer to as the marketing 
elasticity of demand. At the optimum, marginal costs of expanding the consumer 
base are equal to the present value of profits that it generates. Importantly, the latter 
depends on the marketing elasticity of demand. Firms with higher elasticities choose 
to invest relatively heavily in expansion of the consumer base and hence grow rel-
atively large.
Entry Decisions.—Having described the behavior of incumbent firms, we now 
explain the entry phase and in particular how startups choose the type of good to 
produce. For tractability, we restrict the number of goods types to be finite, indexed 
by  i = 1, 2, … , I . Underlying this restriction is an assumption that household 
preferences for individual goods belong to one of a finite number of distributions.
In every period, startups can seize a limited and time-invariant number of busi-
ness opportunities of each goods type, denoted by  ψ i . Business opportunities are 
exclusive, allowing for at most one producer each.14 After paying a stochastic entry 
cost, labeled  X t , potential startups are free to choose any of the business opportuni-
ties.15 They cannot, however, coordinate among themselves.
Therefore, not all startups will succeed because multiple competitors may attempt 
to seize a single business opportunity. We assume that the probability of successfully 
starting up is increasing in the number of business opportunities, but decreasing in 
the number of startup attempts (similar to models of innovation such as Klette and 
Kortum 2004 and Saint-Paul 2002). In particular, the success probability is given 
by  m i, 0, t / e i, t , where  m i, 0, t =  ψ i ϕ  e i, t 1−ϕ is the number of new firms and ϕ ∈ (0, 1). 
Free entry then gives rise to the following condition:
(5)  X t =   m i, 0, t  _____ e i, t   V i  (0,   t ; 0) , for i = 1, 2, … , I .
The above implies that, in equilibrium, aspiring startups are indifferent between 
goods types. The reason is that goods types with higher firm values also generate 
more intense competition for available business opportunities, lowering the success 
probability.
It is straightforward to show that the elasticity of the number of startups within 
a type,  m i, 0, t , with respect to the startup value of that type,  V i(0,   t ; 0) , is given 
by  
1 − ϕ ____ϕ . Thus, endogenous fluctuations in the composition of startups arise to the 
extent that values of firms producing different types of goods fluctuate differently 
over the business cycle. On the contrary, fluctuations in the entry cost do not gen-
erate any direct composition effects because all firms are affected symmetrically.
14 Exclusivity of business opportunities can arise, e.g., from the ownership of patents, or market size limitations 
coupled with fixed costs in production. For tractability we do not model these factors explicitly. 
15 The entry cost is to be paid before entry and is denominated in units of the household’s consumption bundle. 
Online Appendix B.1 shows that the firm’s demand function then becomes  y j, t =  κ j ( s j, t )  (  p j, t  ___ P t  ) 
−η
  Y t . 
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C. Aggregate Shocks and Market Clearing
There are four aggregate shocks in the model, namely shocks to productivity (A), 
demand (Q), entry costs (X), and labor preferences (Z). We assume that all four 
aggregate shocks follow AR(1) processes in logarithms:
(6)  ln  J t = (1 −  ρ J ) ln  _ J +  ρ J ln  J t−1 +  ε t J , for J = A, Q, X, Z ,
where  ρ J is a persistence parameter and  ε t J are i.i.d. innovations distributed normally 
with mean 0 and standard deviation  σ J . The variable  _ J denotes the mean of the given 
shock process and it is normalized to 1 for all shocks except for the entry cost shock. 
The parametrization of the latter is discussed in the calibration section.
Before describing the market-clearing conditions, we exploit that all firms pro-
ducing the same type of good i and of the same age a make identical decisions. 
Accordingly, we replace the firm index j by the type and age indices i and a. The 
labor-market-clearing condition can then be written as
(7)  N t =  ∑ 
i=1
I
  ∑ 
a=0
∞
  m i, a, t  ( n i, a, t G +  n i, a, t M ) ,
where  m i, a, t is the mass of firms of type i and age a. Because entry costs are assumed 
to be paid in terms of the aggregate consumption bundle, the aggregate resource 
constraint can be written as
(8)  C t +  X t  ∑ 
i=1
I
  e i, t =  Y t ,
where aggregate demand is given by  Y t =  ∑ i  ∑ a  m i, a, t  y i, a, t  p i, a, t / P t . The law of 
motion for the mass of firms by age and good type can be written as
(9)  m i, a, t =  (1 −  ρ a−1 )  m i, a−1, t−1 for a = 1, 2, … and i = 1, 2, … , I .
Finally, the aggregate state consists of the mass of firms of each  age-type 
combination, the consumer capital levels of these firms in the previ-
ous period, as well as the values of the stochastic aggregate shocks, i.e., 
  t =  [ A t ,  Q t ,  X t ,  Z t ,  { m i, a−1, t−1 ,  s i, a−1, t−1 } i=1, … , I, a=1, 2, … ] .
D. Endogenous Fluctuations in Startup Composition
This subsection explains intuitively why the composition of startups fluctuates 
endogenously in the model. Online Appendix B.3 provides formal results for a spe-
cial case of the model which allows for closed-form solutions.
The free-entry condition (5) makes clear that incentives to start up firms pro-
ducing particular goods types depend on the relative profitability (firm value) of 
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such businesses. Therefore, the composition of startups changes endogenously to 
the extent that values of firms producing different types of goods are differently 
sensitive to aggregate shocks.
In the estimated model, a quantitatively important reason why the relative val-
ues of different firm types fluctuate over time is that the profits of mass firms are 
relatively sensitive to demand shocks. This happens because demand shocks shift 
the effective cost of consumer base expansion and mass firms optimally devote rel-
atively large fractions of resources to this cost category. The latter result can be 
understood from equation (4) and dates back to Dorfman and Steiner (1954), who 
show that the optimal marketing (advertising) expenditure share is proportional to 
the respective elasticity of demand, which is relatively high for mass firms.
III. Quantitative Implementation
We parameterize the model using a combination of maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation and matching of moments in the BDS. This section describes the calibra-
tion and estimation of model parameters and discusses properties of the model along 
dimensions not directly targeted in the parametrization.
The aggregate state of the model includes the entire firm distribution, creating 
a challenge in solving the model numerically. Our proposed solution strategy is 
based on first-order perturbation around the stationary equilibrium (i.e., around 
the  steady-state growth paths of firms) and on imposing a maximum firm age of 
K = 50 years. This makes the aggregate state finite and enables us to solve the 
model relatively quickly even tough the model consists of more than 900 state vari-
able and all shocks have continuous support. We are also able to track the aggregate 
state entirely, given the approximated policy functions, instead of being forced to 
revert to iterative methods in the spirit of Krusell and Smith (1998), which rely on 
an approximation of the aggregate state.
Detailed descriptions of the solution and estimation methods, as well as robust-
ness exercises with respect to the calibrated model parameters, are presented in 
online Appendix D.
A. Parameters Calibrated to Match Moments
We set the model period to be one year, in line with the frequency of the BDS 
data. While the values of individual parameters typically influence the behavior of 
the entire model, it is instructive to discuss them separately in relation to the spe-
cific moments that we target. For clarity, we divide the calibrated parameters into 
three groups. We start with parameters specific to firm types. Next, we proceed to 
 parameters common to all firms and finally to parameters pertaining to the house-
hold. All model parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Firm-Type Parameters.—Heterogeneity across firms derives from differences in 
consumer demand, summarized by the function  κ i (s) , which is increasing in firms’ 
consumer base  (s) and directly affects firms’ demand constraints. The function  κ i (s) 
depends, in turn, on the underlying distribution of household members’ preferences 
for good type i.
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Given that we cannot observe the preference distributions directly, we opt 
for a parsimonious approach and specify the aggregated preference function 
as  κ i (s) =  _ κi  s  μ i  , with  _ κi ,  μ i > 0 . The firm’s elasticity of demand with respect to 
the consumer base is then given by  ϵ i, t κ, s =  μ i . The condition for optimal marketing 
investment (4) makes clear that this elasticity is a crucial determinant of the firm’s 
returns to marketing, and thus of its incentive to grow large as it ages.
To illustrate how the demand function is related to the distribution of preferences 
over individual goods, Figure 4 plots  κ i (s) and  F i for two parameterizations. In the 
first case, there is no preference dispersion, i.e.,  F i is degenerate around a single 
point. As a result  κ i (s) is linearly increasing in the consumer base s, i.e.,  μ i equals 1. 
We refer to this type of good as a mass good, since the marginal consumer attracted 
by additional marketing brings in the same amount of demand as existing consum-
ers. As a result, the returns to marketing do not fall as the firm grows larger.
The second case illustrates a parametrization for which  μ i is smaller than 1: a 
niche good.16 In this case, the associated preference distribution  F i features a cer-
tain degree of dispersion. Recall that firms first attract consumers with the highest 
16 The scaling parameter of the niche good,  
_ κj , is set such that low levels of the consumer base generate similar 
demand as with the mass good. 
Table 1—Model Parameters
Parameter Value Target
 β discount factor 0.96 Annual interest rate 4 percent 
 σ relative risk aversion coefficient 1 log utility
 ν disutility of labor 0.939 Wage normalization,  p j /P = 1 
 Ψ measure of business opportunities 0.006 Output = 1, normalization
 η price elasticity of substitution 11 10 percent markup
 ξ 0 exit rate function, level 0.050 Exit rates by age, BDS
 ξ 1 exit rate function, curvature 0.170 Exit rates by age, BDS
 
_ X entry cost, mean 1.206 Entrant survival rate = 0.21 percent, BED
 ϕ elasticity of entry function 0.156 std(entrant size)/std(output) = 1.4, BDS
 ρ A TFP shock (A), persistence 0.944
 σ A TFP shock (A), standard deviation 0.011
 ρ Q demand shock (Q), persistence 0.867
 σ Q demand shock (Q), standard deviation 0.057
 ρ X entry cost shock (X), persistence 0.521
 σ X entry cost shock (X), standard deviation 0.014
 ρ Z labor preference shock (Z), persistence 0.983
 σ Z labor preference shock (Z), standard deviation 0.011
Goods types  i 
Parameter value/target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 
_ κi scale of  κ i (s) 2.21 6.27 12.05 10.47 22.16 2.98 1.53 0.83 0.71
average size when old 2.2 6.3 13.1 29.8 68.0 150.2 336.6 658.8 3,511.2
 
 m i, 0  ___ e i  
startup probability (percent) 83.6 29.3 15.1 11.0 4.6 6.2 4.1 3.0 0.7
firm share when old (percent) 45.2 23.9 15.1 9.8 3.2 1.8 0.5 0.2 0.3
 μ i curvature of  κ i (s) 0.009 0.012 0.054 0.364 0.344 0.964 1.189 1.355 1.470
average size by age See Figure 5
Notes: Model parameters and their respective targets. The bottom panel shows type-specific parameters and their 
targets for  i = 1, … , 9 . Instead of reporting the mass of business opportunities in each type ( ψ i ), which is subject 
to a normalization, we report the implied startup probabilities  ( m i , 0 / e i ) . The demand elasticities ( μ i ) are not tar-
geted by type, but rather they are implicitly pinned down by matching average size by age (see Figure 5).
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valuations (levels of  θ ). In the illustration, the valuations of these initial consumers 
for the niche good are similarly high as for the mass good. Thus, for low levels of  s 
the total demand for the niche and the mass good is similar. However, the marginal 
amount of demand coming from additional consumers falls rapidly in case of the 
niche good, but not in case of the mass good. As a result, niche firms face relatively 
low returns to marketing and optimally stay smaller.
In light of the discussion above, we pin down firm-type parameters by targeting 
moments of the firm size distribution observed in the BDS data. Toward this end, we 
consider I = 9 firm types, which is the number of size groups available in the BDS 
database, where we group the three largest size categories into one.
The parameters pertaining to firm (goods) types include  _ κi ,  μ i , and also the mass 
of business opportunities for each firm type,  ψ i . First, assuming that old firms had 
enough time to grow toward their optimal size to reveal their type, we use the firm 
size distribution of 21–25-year-old firms to pin down  
_ κi and  ψ i (up to a scaling fac-
tor  Ψ ). While the former essentially shifts the scale of production, the latter deter-
mines the fraction of firms in each size category.
To pin down the levels of  μ i , we exploit the fact that this parameter affects firms’ 
growth profiles. Because we cannot observe growth profiles of individual firm types 
in the BDS, we use information on the average growth profile in the economy, i.e., 
average firm size by age.17
17 Specifically, we use the BDS information on 0 (startups), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6–10, 11–15, and 16–20-year-old firms. 
Online Appendix C shows that the calibrated values of marketing elasticities of demand in the benchmark model fall 
well within the range of empirical estimates found in existing studies. For some firm types,  μ i is larger than 1. It is 
straightforward to show that this arises if marketing investments attract not only new consumers, but to some extent 
also raise the demand coming from existing consumers. 
s
κ(s
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Mass good
Niche good
θ
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(θ)
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1
Panel A Panel B
Figure 4. Demand Heterogeneity: Illustration
Notes: Illustration of demand heterogeneity between mass and niche goods. Panel A depicts the demand func-
tion  κ(s) . Panel B shows the CDF of the associated preference distribution  F(θ) . The mass good is characterized 
by  μ = 1 , while the niche good has an elasticity of  μ = 0.65 . The level of  _ κi of the niche good, relative to the 
mass good, is set to 6.
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To highlight that average size by age reveals information about heterogeneity in 
the elasticities  μ i , Figure 5 shows average size by age in the data, the benchmark 
model and in an alternative model version in which all firm types face a homoge-
neous  μ (calibrated to match average entrant size). The figure shows that a model 
in which all firms grow at the same pace cannot generate the relatively flat average 
growth profile observed in the data. The success of the benchmark model rests on 
small firms, which constitute the majority of all businesses, reaching their optimal 
size relatively quickly. Thereafter, the average growth profile is shaped by (rare) 
fast-growth firms which gradually gain on importance in the aggregate as they 
become large employers.
Parameters Common to All Firms.—Parameters that are common across all firm 
types are the exogenous firm exit rate,  ρ a , the elasticity of substitution between 
goods varieties,  η , the marketing costs function  ζ(g) , the mass of potential start-
ups,  Ψ , the mean of the entry cost shock,  _ X , and the elasticity of the number of 
startups with respect to firm values  ϕ .
To capture the age-dependency of exit rates observed in the data, we let the exit 
probability be  ρ a =  ξ 0 +  ξ 1 /a . For firms below the maximum age  (a < K ), the 
parameters  ξ 0 and  ξ 1 are chosen to closely match the empirical exit rates conditional 
on age in the BDS. The elasticity of substitution  η is set to 11, implying a 10 percent 
markup over the wage, a common target in the literature. The marketing cost func-
tion is assumed to be quadratic with a level normalized to 1, i.e.,  ζ(g) =  g 2 /2 .18 
The reason for the latter is that the level of adjustment costs is not separately identifi-
able from the level of demand in our model. The implied average costs of  marketing 
18 In online Appendix E.2 we explore adjustment cost functions with different degrees of curvature and show 
that similar results are obtained. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6–10 11–15 16–20 21–25
0
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Model: homog. 
Age (years)
Figure 5. Average Size by Age: Data and Model
Note: Average firm size by age in the data and the benchmark model and an alternative calibration with homoge-
neous  μ (i.e., all firms have identical marketing elasticities of demand), calibrated to match entrant size.
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investment amount to 2.7 percent of gross profits. This is similar to the estimated 
3 percent costs for (capital) investment in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
The last three parameters in this category pertain to firm entry. The measure of 
business opportunities is normalized such that  Y equals 1 in the steady state. From 
the free entry condition (5) it is clear that the level of the entry cost determines the 
probability of successfully starting up a business of a given type (for a given firm 
value). Interpreting this probability as the within-year survival rate,  _ X is set such 
that the model matches the average success probability in the data.19 Finally, we 
set  ϕ , which controls the strength of startup composition effects, such that the model 
matches the volatility of entrant size observed in the BDS.
Household Parameters.—Household preference parameters are chosen in line 
with conventional values in the macro literature. The household’s discount fac-
tor, β , is set to 0.96 , corresponding to an annual real interest rate of 4 percent. 
The household’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ , is set to 1, implying log 
utility with respect to consumption. Finally, the disutility of labor, ν , is backed 
out from the household’s labor supply condition with the wage normalized such 
that  p j /P = η/(η − 1)W = 1 .
B. Parameters Estimated Using Maximum Likelihood
The remaining parameters pertain to the four exogenous aggregate shocks and 
they are estimated using maximum likelihood. We estimate the model using four 
data series: aggregate real GDP, the aggregate employment rate, the number of start-
ups, and the average size of five-year-old firms. The number of startups and firm size 
of five-year-old firms is taken from the BDS. All time series are in logs and linearly 
detrended. The estimated parameters are reported in Table 1 and they are in line 
with estimates in the literature. Further discussion of the estimation (results) can be 
found in online Appendix D.4.
While real GDP is primarily informative about aggregate TFP, aggregate employ-
ment is closely related to the labor preference shock. Even though all shocks affect 
the number of startups, the model matches this variable exactly due to the presence 
of the entry cost shock. Finally, using the average size of five-year-old firms helps to 
pin down fluctuations in the demand shock ( Q ).
To understand the last point, the left panel of Figure 6 shows impulse response 
functions of average size of firms between zero and five years of age to a positive 
demand shock. While average size increases at all ages upon impact, there is an 
echo effect, creating sequential upward spikes in average size for the age categories 
one to five years. These spikes reflect the fact that the composition of the cohort 
born in the initial year of the shock is skewed toward mass firms, which grow to be 
relatively large. While echo effects are also created by other shocks, these effects 
19 Toward this end, we draw on information from the Business Employment Dynamics (BED). Unlike the BDS, 
the BED has quarterly information (for establishments) starting in 1992:III, allowing us to calculate the survival 
rate of establishments younger than one year. We calculate the within-year survival rate assuming that the quarterly 
survival rates are constant in a given year. Table 1 reports the implied type-specific probabilities of successfully 
starting up, rather than the type-specific measures of business opportunities ( ψ i ) which are difficult to interpret and 
which depend on the normalization constant  Ψ . 
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are quantitatively smaller. Thus, using information on the size of firms several years 
after birth helps to discipline the relative strength of the demand shock, and implic-
itly the importance of composition effects.
The impulse responses also make clear that the echo effects gain on strength as 
the affected cohort ages, because the greater share of mass firms steepens the growth 
profile of the cohort. This means that composition effects leave their mark by creat-
ing a positive relation between age and the volatility of average firm size. The right 
panel of Figure 6 illustrates that the estimated model captures well this empirical 
pattern of volatility of average firm size by age (only averages over five cohorts are 
reported for firms older than six years, as in the BDS). To highlight the role of com-
position effects, the right panel of Figure 6 also depicts the volatility of average size 
by age when the composition of startups is held fixed. Without fluctuations in the 
composition of startups, the volatility of average size declines with age.20
Finally, even for firms older than five years, which were not used in the calibra-
tion or estimation procedure, the model correctly predicts an increasing pattern of 
volatility of average size. The extent of this increase is actually somewhat smaller 
than in the data. This reassures us that the estimated degree of composition changes, 
which drives the increasing pattern of average size volatility, is rather conservative.
C. Model Properties
This subsection assesses the model’s performance along several dimensions not 
directly exploited in the estimation and provides external support for the demand 
channel in the data.
20 This is also true if we reestimate the model. In computing this decomposition, only the startup composition is 
held fixed at its steady state, but all other variables are left to adjust. 
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Figure 6. Impulse Response Functions and Volatility of Firm Size by Age
Notes: The left panel shows impulse response functions of average size, by age, to a positive one-standard-deviation 
demand shock in percent deviations from steady state. The right panel shows average size volatility by age in the 
data, the model, and in a model where composition is fixed (model without composition).
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Firm Dynamics.—Table 2 displays several model statistics and compares them 
with their empirical counterparts. Panel A shows that the model is successful in 
matching the empirical stylized facts described in Section I.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the predictions of the model are close to the data also 
for dynamics of firms older than five years. First, we show that cohort-level employ-
ment at entry is correlated with employment of the same cohort even 11–15 years 
later (summed over the appropriate 5-year window).21 Second, to gauge the extent 
to which variation in employment of old firms is related to changes in firm size, 
we correlate changes in cohort-level employment (in percent) with changes in the 
average size within these cohorts. This relation is highly positive both in the data 
and in the model.
Finally, we compare the model’s predictions on real wages to the data. The cor-
relation between the real wage in the model and the data is 0.53. Also, the volatility 
of the real wage relative to output is close to that in the data (0.71 in the model 
versus 0.61 in the data). The procyclicality of wages, however, is too strong in the 
model relative to the data, a common finding in business-cycle models without wage 
rigidities.22
Inspecting the Demand Channel.—This subsection provides external support for 
the demand channel which, as will be quantified in the next section, is the key driver 
of endogenous composition changes of startups.
A positive demand shock eases the expansion of firms’ sales capacities. Firm 
types that need a larger consumer base to reach their efficient scale benefit relatively 
21 We choose to report correlations for the age group 11–15-year-old firms as a compromise between a higher 
firm age and a long enough time-series. Correlations for young firm age groups are also close to those in the data. 
22 The correlation between output and real wages is 0.96 in the model and 0.41 in the data. In the data, we mea-
sure the real wage as real hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector. 
Table 2—Firm Dynamics in the Data and Model
Data Model
Panel A. Employment dynamics of young firms
Fact 1:  corr ( N 0 , ΔN) 0.39 0.46 
Fact 2:  corr ( N 0 ,  N 5 ) 0.59 0.62 
Fact 3:  
var( S 0−5 ) _______
var( N 5 ) 
70 percent 72 percent 
Panel B. Employment dynamics of old firms
 corr ( N 0 ,  N 11−15 ) 0.86 0.73 
 corr (Δ log ( N 11−15 ), Δ log ( S 11−15 )) 0.88 0.82 
Notes: Untargeted model statistics and their empirical counterparts. The function  corr( ·, · ) 
denotes the correlation,  var( · ) denotes the variance, and  Δ is the first-difference operator. 
Variables  N a and  S a denote, respectively, employment and average size in firm cohorts of 
age  a ,  N denotes the aggregate employment rate, and  
var( S 0−5 ) ________
var( N 5 ) denotes the fraction of total 
 cohort-level employment variation among five-year-old firms attributed to variations in aver-
age size.
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strongly from the positive demand shock. This creates stronger incentives to start up 
mass-goods-producing firms. At the same time, aggregate profits decline, as firms 
seize the opportunity to invest in consumer base expansion at a low cost. In the esti-
mated model, the correlation between average firm size of 5-year-old firms in year 
t and aggregate marketing expenditures (profits) relative to GDP at the time of birth 
of the firm cohort, i.e., year t − 5 , is 0.75 (− 0.60).
Figure 7 corroborates this prediction in the data by plotting aggregate 
 advertising-to-GDP and profits-to-GDP together with average firm size of 
 five-year-old firms, where the latter has been shifted back to the respective year of 
birth. In the data, the correlation between the size of five-year-old firms in year t and 
aggregate advertising expenditures (profits) relative to GDP in year t − 5 is 0.60 
(− 0.53). Both correlations are reasonably close to the aforementioned counterparts 
in the model.
In addition to the presented aggregate evidence, online Appendix A.10 provides 
empirical support for the proposed mechanism using 4-digit industry data from 
the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) linked with the input-output tables of 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Specifically, we show that, as predicted by our 
model,  industries with relatively high marketing expenditure shares tend to display 
stronger cohort effects.23
23 While the QWI allows for a fine sectoral disaggregation, its time and spacial coverage are relatively sparse, 
preventing the construction of aggregate time series as observed in the BDS. We therefore use the BDS for our 
main analysis. 
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Figure 7. Demand Channel in the Data
Notes: Advertising-to-GDP ratio (ranging from 1979 to 2010 and taken from Hall 2014), the profit share (rang-
ing from 1979 to 2012 and computed as corporate after-tax profits divided by nominal GDP), and average size of 
five-year-old firms (BDS) shifted back to the year of startup (and thus ranging from 1979 to 2008).
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IV. Model Results
The purpose of the model is to quantify fluctuations in the composition of start-
ups with respect to their growth potential and to investigate to what extent such 
changes shape cohort-level and aggregate dynamics. Our first goal is to establish 
the importance of the year of birth in determining a cohort’s success in providing 
jobs in later years and to understand the underlying sources of variation. Next, we 
investigate the importance of startup conditions for aggregate outcomes.
A. The Importance of Startup Conditions for Cohort-Level Fluctuations
At any age after birth, a cohort’s employment level is to some extent determined 
by the economic state in the year of birth. The remainder is because of shocks that 
realized after birth. Disentangling the relative importance of these two contributors 
empirically is difficult, if only because the aggregate state may include unobservable 
variables.
Within our estimated model, however, we can quantify the contribution of 
the economic state at birth precisely. Let us first define cohort-level employment 
as  N a, t ≡  ∑ i=1 I  m i, a, t  n i, a, t . We can then decompose cohort-level employment 
as  N a, t =  E t−a [ N a, t ] +  N a˜, t , where the first term is the expectation of  N a, t conditional 
on information available in the year of birth and  N a˜, t is the prediction error. The latter 
is a function of only the shocks realized in the years after birth, which are orthogo-
nal to the state in the year of birth. Using this orthogonality, we can decompose the 
unconditional variance of  N a, t as
  var ( N a, t ) =   var ( E t−a [ N a, t ] )  
aggregate state at birth
   +   var ( N a˜, t )  ⏟shocks after birth
  .
The top-left panel of Figure 8 plots the results of the variance decompositions 
for cohorts up to 20 years after birth. The importance of the aggregate state at birth 
is overwhelming, contributing to more than 90 percent of the employment vari-
ance, regardless of age. A very similar pattern is found for cohort-level average size 
(middle-left panel), which is consistent with average size being a strong driver of 
the employment patterns. However, for the average size of an individual firm of a 
certain type, the state at birth loses importance in the years following entry (bot-
tom-left panel). This happens as composition effects are not directly relevant. The 
persistence that remains is driven by the inherent persistence of the shock processes 
and by the endogenous part of the aggregate state.
Additional insight into the drivers of cohort-level persistence is obtained by quan-
tifying the contributions of the four aggregate shocks (right panels of Figure 8). The 
demand shock stands out as the dominant driver of not only cohort-level employ-
ment and average size, but also of average size of an individual firm. In other words, 
it plays a crucial role not only in shaping conditions at entry, but also later in firms’ 
lives. In particular, the shock explains about 90 percent of average size variation of 
an individual firm at startup and about 60 percent at age 20.
Using our model, we can also shed more light on the variance decomposition pre-
sented in Section I, which quantifies the relative contributions of the intensive and 
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Figure 8. Model Variance Decompositions
Notes: Contributions of the aggregate state at birth and post-entry shocks (left panels) and the contributions of the 
four aggregate shocks (right panels) to variation in cohort-level employment (top row), cohort-level average size 
(middle row), and individual-firm average size (bottom row).
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extensive margins to cohort-level employment fluctuations in the data. Specifically, 
we quantify how much of the observed contribution of the intensive margin is due 
to changes in startup conditions only. We do so by exploiting that, as a by-product 
of the estimation procedure, we obtain model-predicted time paths for all model 
variables. This includes unobservables, such as the entire distribution of firms across 
age and type bins, and hence enables us to conduct decompositions that cannot be 
done using data alone.
First, we revisit the variance decomposition of cohort-level employment, as 
is done in Figure 3, but this time using the model-predicted time paths over the 
sample period rather than actual data. Figure 9 compares the variance decompo-
sition in the data (panel A) to its counterpart in the model (panel B). Overall, the 
model-implied decomposition is close to its empirical counterpart, even though it 
was not directly targeted.24
Next, we further decompose the contribution of the intensive margin using the 
following formula:
  S a, t =   ∑ i  m i, a, t  n i, a, t   ___________ ∑ i  m i, a, t  =   
 ∑ i  m i, a, t  _ ni, a   ___________ ∑ i  m i, a, t   
startup conditions only
 
 
+   ∑ i  m i, a, t ( n i, a, t −  
_ ni, a )_________________  ∑ i  m i, a, t  ,
where  S a, t is average size of firms of age a in period t , expressed as the weighted 
average of firm employment levels ( n i, a, t ) across the different firm types i , and 
24 In the model, size growth in year one covaries slightly negatively with cohort-level employment and it there-
fore decreases the overall contribution of the intensive margin. 
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Figure 9. Contribution of Average Size to Employment Variation in Model
Notes: Contributions of average firm size at different ages to the variation in cohort-level employment as a percent-
age of its total variance. Data are obtained from the estimated model. The solid line labeled Startup conditions only 
plots the covariance between cohort-level employment and average firm size obtained by fixing firm-level employ-
ment within age/type brackets to its steady-state value, scaled by the total variance of cohort-level employment.
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where  
_ ni, a are the associated steady-state values. The component labeled Startup 
conditions only represents a time series which isolates fluctuations in average firm 
size resulting from only startup composition changes, which is achieved by fixing 
firm-specific employment levels to their steady-state values, conditional on type and 
age.25 As before, we then quantify the contribution of such composition changes to 
cohort-level employment variation by computing the covariance of this time series 
with cohort-level employment, scaled by the variance of cohort-level employment.
The contribution of changes in startup composition to fluctuations in cohort-level 
employment is depicted by the solid line in Figure 9 (Startup conditions only). In 
the year of entry, only about 13 percent of cohort-level employment fluctuations are 
due to compositional effects, substantially less than the overall contribution of the 
intensive margin. The importance of changes in composition, however, grows mark-
edly with age. By the age of five, composition accounts for more than 50 percent of 
cohort-level employment fluctuations.
B. The Importance of Startup Conditions for Aggregate Fluctuations
We now use the estimated model to better understand how startup decisions affect 
aggregate employment dynamics. First, we isolate aggregate employment fluctua-
tions driven only by cyclical changes in the number of startups in the various firm 
types, i.e., by aggregate fluctuations in startup conditions. Second, we investigate to 
what extent the demand shock impacts on aggregate employment dynamics.
To quantify the extent to which employment fluctuations are driven by changes in 
startup conditions, we again exploit the model-predicted time-varying distribution 
of firms across types and ages and the associated employment levels. Specifically, 
we decompose aggregate employment as follows:
  N t =  ∑ 
a
  ∑ 
i
  m i, a, t n i, a, t =  ∑ 
a
  ∑ 
i
  m i, a, t  _ ni, a 
 
startup conditions only
  +  ∑ 
a
  ∑ 
i
  m i, a, t ( n i, a, t −  _ ni, a ) .
This formula allows us to construct a time series for a component of aggregate 
employment which isolates variation purely due to fluctuations in entry into the 
various type bins. Again, this is achieved by setting employment levels, conditional 
on age and type, to their steady-state values, although this time we aggregate over 
all firms rather than firms in specific cohorts. We again refer to this time series as 
startup conditions only, because entry decisions depend purely on economic condi-
tions in the year of startup.
Figure 10 shows that the contribution of startup conditions to aggregate employ-
ment fluctuations is large. Interestingly, the series resembles a slow-moving trend 
in aggregate employment. In fact, the correlation between the component of aggre-
gate employment isolating startup conditions only and the HP-trend in aggregate 
employment is 0.65 for a smoothing coefficient of 100 and 0.73 for a smoothing 
25 Note that  m i, a, t is fully determined in the year of birth, as the exit rate is constant in the model. 
3208 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW OCTOBER 2017
coefficient of 6.23, the latter following Ravn and Uhlig (2002).26 Thus, startup deci-
sions appear to be important also for understanding the low-frequency movements 
of aggregate employment, often ignored in business-cycle analysis.
Finally, given the importance of the demand channel for cohort-level outcomes, 
we investigate to what extent demand shocks explain dynamics at the aggregate 
level. Toward this end, we fix the aggregate demand shock to be equal to 0 in our 
model, but leave the remaining estimated three shocks untouched. Figure 10 shows 
the resulting time path of aggregate employment (No demand shocks).
Without demand shocks, which are particularly important for changes in the com-
position of firms with respect to their potential to grow large, the resulting time series 
for aggregate employment is roughly 10 percent less volatile than the actual employ-
ment rate observed in the data. Moreover, in certain periods, demand shocks were 
particularly important. On the one hand, demand shocks, and the associated shift 
toward high growth potential firms, served to increase aggregate employment by 0.5 
to 1 percent at the end of the millennium. On the other hand, the opposite happened 
during and in the aftermath of the Great Recession, where aggregate employment 
would have fallen by about 1 percentage point less had it not been for the demand 
shock. Thus, the estimated model predicts that demand shocks have had important 
effects not only on cohort-level outcomes, but also on the aggregate economy.
26 The estimation uses linearly detrended employment rate data. However, the linear trend is very modest and 
therefore comparing the startup conditions only series with the HP-filter trend of the data used for estimation deliv-
ers very similar results. 
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Figure 10. Employment Rate: Data and Estimated Contribution of Startup Conditions
Notes: Startup conditions only refers to the time series for the employment rate that is constructed by fixing the age/
type firm sizes to their respective steady-state values. No demand shocks is constructed by feeding all the estimated 
shocks through the model, except for the demand shocks which are set to zero.
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V. Conclusion
This paper exploits the recent opportunity to break down aggregate employment 
data into cohort-level observations, in order to improve our understanding of fluctu-
ations in macroeconomic aggregates. New stylized facts direct our attention to the 
birth stage of entering firms and in particular to the composition of startups with 
respect to their growth potential. Our results indicate that cohorts of large firms 
tend to be born during periods of booming consumer demand, when it is relatively 
easy for firms to acquire new customers. Moreover, the impact of entry decisions 
not only persists as cohorts mature, but their magnitude increases over time since 
firms with highly scalable businesses need time to reach their full potential. Hence, 
compositional differences across cohorts become increasingly pronounced with age, 
accounting for slow-moving but large fluctuations in aggregate employment.
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